In this paper, we consider the problem of the mechanism design for the multi-agents system. We develop the social learning model for the mechanism design for creating the collective action with an efficient cost sharing rule. We consider the situation in which self-interest agents have incentives to cooperate each other for jointly acquiring the environmental level with sharing the necessary cost. We obtain the optimal level of the environment to be acquired and the cost allocation rule so that their individual rationality is satisfied, and at the same time the social rationality is also satisfied. We show that the factors such as the value (worth) of the environmental level perceived by each agent and the cost affect the level the collective action. A social rule of allocating the common cost among agents is developed with decentralized transaction mechanism. We formulate and analyze the problem of cooperating multiple agents under uncertainty. We show that when agents cooperate in order to encounter uncertainty when acting alone, their benefits would not be as attractive, and hence cooperate to share the risk. As a specific example, we consider the model of obtaining the environmental level by sharing cost. We propose the negotiation mechanism for sharing cost among agents. With that mechanism, they can learn and obtain the unbiased and fare cost distribution rule.
Introduction
Like a human individual or an organization, an agent is a theoretical concept constructed to exhibit the property of an autonomous entity, which seeks to achieve a self-interest goal.
They may form an organization because of the joint interest for efficient resource acquisition or allocation. They may form an organization for sharing the necessary cost of the common infrastructure (2)(3)(4) (6) .
In this paper, we consider the collective action problem of multi-agents. When acting alone without cooperation, their standalone behavior would not be as attractive, and hence the collective action can be attractive. Collective action for sharing with the changing incentive of each agent. Therefore in order to form the optimal collective action, it may require that their interest or incentive is not jeopardized, and the conditions of both the individual rationality and the social rationality should be satisfied.
However, conflicts may occur when agents behave in such that the cost accordingly to the declared value of each agent.
We can also consider a society of agents each of them behaves with the common goal. The key element that distinguishes such a common goal from an agent's individual goal is that it requires a collective action. These collective action problems also pose difficult quandaries for a society. However, each member of the society who wants to attain a common goal, may be tempted to benefit from goal without contributing to the common goal. There is a long history of interest in such social dilemmas, known as free riding problems of this type in many fields (3) . It may require same enforcement in the form of social rule in order to achieve a common goal (1) . The problem of incentive compatible may occur when these agents behave in such that the cost accordingly to each value possessed.
In these cases, an efficient and unbiased social rule is thus required to evaluate the best sharing rule among the agents to even out the conflicts. We will discuss the collective action problem with basing the mechanism design. With this mechanism, the optimal level of the environment can be acquired. The mechanism also provides an efficient and unbiased social rule for sharing the common cost necessary for acquiring the environmental level at the optimal level. We design the model of social learning in which an efficient and unbiased cost sharing as a social rule is obtained through the decentralized adjustment process.
Environmental issues of the collective actions
When agents deal with one another, they often bring to the encounter differing goals, and the interaction process takes conflict into account. Each agent pursues its own goals through encountering with other agents; arrangements should be made so that each individual's goal can be satisfied. Agents also may promise, threaten, and find compromises together that will satisfy all agents. The very basic question is then stated as why and how do agents should cooperate than to act independently. There can be many answers to this multi-edged question, but generally, it can be deduced that agents cooperate in order to share the common benefit or the certain load which each individual cannot fulfill alone. The agents benefit from the cooperative behaviors of sharing the cost or a load where they cannot fulfill alone (5) (7) .
In this paper, we consider the cooperating problem of multiple agents under uncertain situations. As a specific example, we consider the problem of cooperating agents in the environmental maintenance model. The price is not set on the loss by environmental pollution and when the polluter produces and consumes without considering the loss, environmental pollution as the external diseconomy is generated. For many sorts of pollution, particularly that of the atmosphere or sea, it is fairly accurate to say that a polluter cannot choose to pollute one group of agents rather than another, that is, pollution can be said as a pure public bad and hence pollution reduction as a public good (8) . In this situation, two or more agents cooperate to share the cost of obtaining certain environmental level from environmental maintenance activity. The agents benefit from the cooperative behavior in maximizing their utility. When acting alone by themselves, their benefits would not be as attractive, and hence they cooperate by sharing the cost. finds out that by cooperating with other agents to share the cost so that his utility will be improved. In this case, the agent is said to be benefiting from the collective action with sharing the common cost.
The optimal social rule and free riding problem
In this section, we obtain the optimal level of the environmental level to be acquired by a society and investigate the properties of the collective action. Each agent assesses all the results of his behaviors, and this assessment is measured in terms of his utility.
To participate in the collective action through negotiation, each agent first examines if his utility is improved by obtaining such the environmental level. In other words, individual rationality must first be satisfied. At the same time social rationality must be satisfied. This condition requires that when an agreement is reached, neither of the agent's utility will be increased without declining the other agents' utilities. 
As a special example, we consider the following semi-linear utility function of each agent.
where i α represents the benefit coefficient received from the environment. This is private information. If one agent has big value of i α , he can receive big benefit from environment.
Contrary, if another agent has small value of i α , he receives small benefit from environment. Then the condition of the individual rationality is given as
Therefore, each agent agrees to share the environmental level if the following condition is satisfied. The condition of the social rationality requires that when an agreement is reached, no agent's utility will decline, and no one will be improved by any means. We specify the optimal solution that maximizes the summation of each individual utility in (3.3) as a solution satisfying the social rationality. 
where F X Y ( , ) represents the kind of the production function of the environmental level Y in terms of the private resource . The optimal solution of (3.6) is given by solving the following function,
As a special case, we consider the following quasi-linear utility function of each agent i, i n = 12 , ,..., The production function of the environmental level in terms of the private resource appeared as the constraint in (3.8) is defined using the exchange function
Therefore the substitute rate of the environmental level to the private resource is given as
Similarly, the substitute rate of the environmental level Y to the private resource of agent i is given as follows:
Therefore, the optimal level of the environmental level to be acquired by the society is given as the solution that satisfies As a special example, we consider the following case where He can decrease the cost with false. From this, someone comes to manipulate his private information. Clark-Groves mechanism is known well as a method of solving this problem. Though as for this mechanism, the surplus is caused in formulation of the rule side. So the cost shared by each agent increases (9) .
An evolutional approach for designing cost sharing rules
We now discuss about how the process of mutual learning is The preceding sections explained mainly about the rationality of the agents in cooperating with each other, and the cost distribution rules that governs the cooperative behaviors.
Proposed Model 1
In this section, we will discuss about how negotiation is carried out to satisfy the rationalities of the agents during cooperative behaviors. In our proposed model, there exists a negotiation manager within the same community of the participating agents as illustrated in Fig. 3 . We show that
Pareto-efficient can be achieved if there is no manipulator. Step5: Repeat Step1 to Step4.
The point of this negotiation mechanism is that the cost shared by each agent is decided according to his marginal utility.
A simulation applying the above suggested protocol was performed to examine the behaviors of the agents during the negotiation process. In this simulation, when we sat the parameters of population initial private resource benefit coefficient received from the environment 
Proposed Model 2
The point of problem is that we can not know each agent's private information. We can not find the manipulator and give them penalty individually. Then, we added the third party to model 1 as illustrated in Fig. 8 . Fig. 8 The coordination of the cooperation protocol 2
We bring in the mechanism of all-or-nothing. The mechanism is that we added two steps after Step2 of Model 1. 80%)
The first understanding from these results, optimal levels have risen compared with the case of small population. This is a natural result. The point that should be paid attention, the big difference is caused by the difference of the proposed environmental level of third party. If the third party proposes the low level 60000, environmental level Y and average utility rise early. But they don't reach the optimal level. Oppositely, if the third party proposes the high level 600000, environmental level Y and average utility rise late. Especially, there is a problem of minus the utility. But they reach the optimal level.
Conclusions
We started out with examining the nature of the collective action of agents, that is, why they cooperate, and then further discussed about how they cooperate in order to share the common cost. Next, we propose the negotiation mechanism for sharing cost among agents. We showed that this mechanism can obtain the optimal level of the environment according to the private information of each agent. We must consider the social meaning of third party. We think that non-governmental organization like NPO and NGO can perform the role of third party. However the problem still remains which way we should adopt the proposal, high level or low level. It is a trade-off relation. It also can be said that this is a social dilemma.
